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Abstract—The security of our data stores is underestimated in current practice, which resulted in many large-scale data breaches. To
change the status quo, this paper presents the design of ShieldDB, an encrypted document database. ShieldDB adapts the searchable
encryption technique to preserve the search functionality over encrypted documents without having much impact on its scalability.
However, merely realising such a theoretical primitive suffers from real-world threats, where a knowledgeable adversary can exploit the
leakage (aka access pattern to the database) to break the claimed protection on data confidentiality. To address this challenge in
practical deployment, ShieldDB is designed with tailored padding countermeasures. Unlike prior works, we target a more realistic
adversarial model, where the database gets updated continuously, and the adversary can monitor it at an (or multiple) arbitrary time
interval(s). ShieldDB’s padding strategies ensure that the access pattern to the database is obfuscated all the time. Additionally,
ShieldDB provides other advanced features, including forward privacy, re-encryption, and flushing, to further improve its security and
efficiency. We present a full-fledged implementation of ShieldDB and conduct intensive evaluations on Azure Cloud.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Data breaches are happening quite frequently in recent
time, affecting millions of individuals. This phenomenon
calls for increased control and security for private and
sensitive data. To combat against such “breach fatigue”,
encrypted database systems recently receive wide atten-
tion [1]–[7]. Their objective is to preserve the query func-
tionality of databases over encrypted data; that is, the server
can process a client’s encrypted query without decryption.
The first generation of encrypted databases [1]–[3] imple-
ments property-preserving encryption (PPE) in a way that
a ciphertext inherits equality and/or order properties of
the underlying plaintext. However, inference attacks can
compromise these encryption schemes by exploiting the
above properties preserved in the ciphertexts [8].
In parallel, dedicated privacy-preserving query schemes
are investigated intensively in the past decade. Among
others, searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [9], [10] is
well known for its application to keyword based search. In
general, SSE schemes utilise an encrypted index to enable
the server to search over encrypted documents. The server
is restricted such that only if a query token (keyword cipher-
text) is given, the search operation against the index will be
triggered to output the matched yet encrypted documents.
This ensures that an adversary with a full image of the
encrypted database learns no useful information about the
documents. In that sense, SSE outperforms PPE in terms of
security. Apart from security, SSE is scalable, because it is
realised via basic symmetric primitives like pseudo-random
functions and symmetric encryption.
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In this paper, we aim to design an encrypted docu-
ment database system built on SSE. However, deploying
SSE in practice is non-trivial. The foremost challenge is
how to address recent emerging inference attacks against
SSE [11]–[13], which raise doubts whether SSE achieves
an acceptable tradeoff between the efficiency and security.
As a noteworthy threat, the count attack [12] demonstrates
that an adversary with extra background knowledge of a
dataset can analyse the size of the query result set to recover
keywords from the query tokens. The above information
is known as access pattern, and can be monitored via the
server’s memory access and communication between the
server and client. If SSE is deployed to a database, access
patterns can also be derived from database logs [14]. This
situation further reduces the security claim of SSE, since the
adversary does not have to stay online for monitoring.
Using padding (bogus documents) is proven as a con-
ceptually simple but effective countermeasure to obfuscate
the access pattern against the aforementioned attacks [11],
[12], [15]. Unfortunately, existing padding countermeasures
only consider a static database, where padding is only
added at the setup [15], [16]. They are not sufficient for real-
world applications. In practice, the states of database change
over the time. Specifically, the updates of documents change
the access pattern for a given keyword, and new keywords
can be introduced randomly at any time. Hence, exploring
to what extend adversaries can exploit such changes to
compromise the privacy of data and how padding coun-
termeasures can be applied in a dynamic environment are
essential to make SSE deployable in practice.
Contributions: To address the above issues, in this pa-
per, we propose and implement an encrypted document
database named ShieldDB, in which the data and query
security in realistic and dynamic application scenarios is
enhanced via effective padding countermeasures. Our con-
tributions can be summarised as follows:
• ShieldDB is the first encrypted database that can
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2support encrypted keyword search, while equipping
with padding countermeasures against inference at-
tacks launched by adversaries with database back-
ground knowledge.
• We define two new types of the attack models, i.e.,
non-persistent and persistent adversaries, which faith-
fully reflect different real-world threats in a contin-
uously updated database. Accordingly, we propose
padding countermeasures to address these two ad-
versaries, respectively.
• ShieldDB is designed with a dedicated system ar-
chitecture to achieve the functionality and security
goals. Apart from the client and server modules
for encrypted keyword search, a padding service is
developed. This service leverages two controllers,
i.e., cache controller and padding controller, to enable
efficient and effective database padding.
• ShieldDB implement advanced features to further
improve the security and performance. These fea-
tures include: 1) forward privacy that protects the
newly inserted document, 2) flushing that can reduce
the load of the padding service, and 3) re-encryption
that refreshes the ciphertexts while realising deletion
and reducing padding overhead.
• We present the implementation and optimization of
ShieldDB, and deploy it in Azure Cloud. We build a
streaming scenario for evaluation. In particular, we
implement an aggressive padding mode (high mode)
and a conservative padding mode (low mode), and
compare them with padding strategies against non-
persistent and persistent adversaries, respectively.
We perform a comprehensive set of evaluations on
the load of the cache, system throughput, padding
overhead, and search time. Our results confirm that
the high mode results in much larger padding over-
head than the low mode does, while achieving lower
cache load. In contrast, the low mode results in
higher system throughput (accumulated amount of
real data) but requiring a significantly higher cache
load. The evaluations of flushing and re-encryption
demonstrate the reduction of the cache load and
padding overhead, respectively.
1.1 Technical Overview
To design effective padding countermeasures for a dynamic
database, we identify two new attack models (i.e., non-
persistent and persistent adversaries). The non-persistent ad-
versary can monitor a targeted database at one certain (but
arbitrary) time interval. Within that interval, the database
state remains unchanged. The adversary also has the back-
ground knowledge of the database at that state. Advanced
than the non-persistent adversary, the persistent (stronger)
adversary can monitor the database over multiple arbitrary
time intervals, and have the background knowledge of the
database at multiple states.
Our first observation to address the above adversaries is
that bogus and real data needs to be inserted in a batch and
mixed manner, so that the adversary cannot distinguish the
bogus data from the real one. In particular, our system im-
plements a dedicated component, called Padding Service, to
perform padding, encryption, and insertion. The incoming
documents are indexed as keyword and document id pairs
denoted as entries, and cached by this service. To reduce the
padding overhead, keywords with similar frequencies are
clustered together, and the above entries are cached to the
corresponding clusters. Once a cluster is full, the entries in
that cluster will be padded in a way that the access pattern
of each keyword therein is identical. After that, all real and
bogus entries are encrypted and inserted to the database.
However, the above basic strategy can still fail to defend
against the above two adversaries we have identified. Our
key observation is that keyword existence is critical infor-
mation and can be exploited by the adversaries.
For non-persistent adversary, if a keyword never appears
in the database while its entries being padded, the adversary
is able to identify the padding for this keyword during her
controlled time interval. The reason is that if such a keyword
is queried, the server should return an empty set. However,
due to the padding, the server would return some results,
which is essentially the padding. To handle this issue,
Padding Service is programmed to keep tracking the state
of each keyword. No padding will be added for keywords
that have never appeared before. When a keyword of a
cluster appears in the first time, Padding Service ensures all
keywords that have already appeared of that cluster have
the same result length.
For persistent adversary, as she is able to monitor the
database over the time and have knowledge on its changes,
it is even more difficult to hide the keyword existence
information. For example, if a keyword does not exist in the
first time interval, but appearing in the second time interval,
following the above approach, the server will return an
empty result set at the first interval and a non-empty set
at the second interval. As seen, this keyword can easily be
identified. To address this adversary, we apply a conserva-
tive constraint to the first batch of each keyword cluster; that
is, all keywords have to appear before insertion. Based on
this treatment, Padding Service can perform padding for all
keywords in the cluster no matter a keyword appears in the
subsequent time interval or not. The server will not expose
unique access patterns at any time interval.
Based on the proposed padding countermeasures, we
deploy the SSE scheme proposed in [17] (a dictionary-
based index) to ShieldDB. Padding Service is designed with
two primary modules, i.e., Cache Controller and Padding
Controller, which jointly conduct the cache management,
state tracking, padding, encryption, and batch insertion. To
further improve the security, efficiency, and functionality,
ShieldDB provides three advanced features, i.e., forward
privacy, cache flushing, and re-encryption. Forward pri-
vacy [18] hides the linkability between the searched query
tokens and newly inserted documents. Cache flushing can
empty the “cold” cache of keyword clusters, where the
padding is barely triggered. Re-encryption can periodically
pull the index entries of different clusters back to Padding
Service for re-padding and re-encryption. In that way, re-
dundant bogus entries are removed, and the access pattern
is reset. Also, deletion can naturally be implemented.
32 BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the background knowledge
related to the design of our system.
Symmetric searchable encryption. Considering a client and
a server, the client encrypts documents in a way that the
server can query keywords over the encrypted documents.
Functions included in an SSE scheme are setup and search.
If the scheme is dynamic, update functions (data addi-
tion and deletion) are also supported. Let DB represent a
database of documents, and each document is a variable-
length set of unique keywords. We use ∆ = {w1, ..., wm} to
present all keywords occurred in DB, DB(w) to present doc-
uments that contain w, and |DB(w)| to denote the number of
those documents, i.e., the size of the query result set for w.
In SSE, the encrypted database, named EDB, is a collection
of encrypted keyword and document id pairs (w, id)’s, aka
an encrypted searchable index.
In setup, client encrypts DB by using a cryptographic
key k, and sends EDB to server. During search, client takes
k and a query keyword w as an input, and outputs a query
token tk. S uses tk to query EDB to get the pseudo-random
identifies of the matched documents, so as to return the
encrypted result documents. In update, C takes an input
of k, a document Di parsed as a set of (w, id) pairs, and
an operation op ∈ {add, del}. For addition, the above pairs
are inserted to EDB. For deletion, server no longer returns
encrypted documents in subsequent search queries. As an
output, server returns an updated EDB.
The security of SSE can be quantified via a tuple of
stateful leakage functions L = (LSetup,LSearch,LUpdate).
They define the side information exposed in setup, search,
and update operations, respectively. The detailed definitions
can be referred to Section 6.
Count Attack. Cash et al. [16] propose a practical attack
that exploits the leakage in the search operation of SSE.
It is assumed that an adversary with full or partial prior
knowledge of DB can uncover keywords from query tokens
via access pattern. Specifically, the prior knowledge allows
the adversary to learn the documents matching a given
keyword before queries. Based on this, she can construct
a keyword co-occurrence matrix indicating keyword coex-
isting frequencies in known documents. As a result, if the
result length |DB(w)| for a query token tk is unique and
matches with the prior knowledge, the adversary directly
recovers w. For tokens with the same result length, the
co-occurrence matrix can be leveraged to narrow down
the candidates. In this work, we extend the threat model
of the count attack to the dynamic setting, which will be
introduced in Section 3.2.
Forward Privacy. Forward privacy in SSE prevents the
adversary from exploiting the leakage in update (addition)
operations. Given previously collected query tokens, this
security notion ensures that these tokens cannot be used
to match newly added documents. As our system consid-
ers the scenario, where the documents are continuously
inserted, we adapt an efficient scheme with forward pri-
vacy [19] proposed by Song et al. This scheme follows
Bost’s scheme [18] that employs trapdoor permutation to
secure states associated to newly added (w, id)’s. Without
being given new states, the server cannot perform search on
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Fig. 1: Architecture of ShieldDB
the new data, and those states can be used to recover old
states via trapdoor permutation. Specifically, we optimise
the adapted scheme in the context of batch insertion and im-
prove the efficiency, which will be introduced in Section 5.3.
3 OVERVIEW
3.1 System Architecture
ShieldDB is a document-oriented database, where semi-
structured records are modeled and stored as documents,
and can be queried via keywords or associated attributes.
Participants and application scenarios: As illustrated in
Figure 1, ShieldDB consists of a query client C, a padding
service P and a storage server S. In our targeted scenario,
new documents are continuously inserted to S, and required
to be encrypted. Meanwhile, C expects S to retain search
functionality over the encrypted documents. To enhance
the security, P adapts padding countermeasures during
encryption. In this paper, we consider an enterprise that
utilises outsourced storage. P is deployed at the enterprise
gateway to encrypt and upload the documents created by
its employees, while C is deployed for employees to search
the encrypted documents at S. Note that the deployment of
P is flexible. It can be separated from or co-located with C.
Overview: ShieldDB supports three main operations, i.e.,
setup, streaming, and search; it also supports deletion and
re-encryption as introduced later. During setup, the module
App Controller receives a sample dataset and groups key-
words into clusters based on their frequencies. After that,
App Controller notifies the cluster information to the module
Cache Controller to initialise a cache for each keyword cluster.
In the meantime, App Controller notifies the same informa-
tion to the module Padding Controller to generate a set of
bogus documents (i.e. padding).
During streaming, P receives a sequence of documents
and parses them into a set of keyword and document
identifier (w, id) pairs, i.e., index entries for search. Then
Cache Controller stores these pairs to the caches of the cor-
responding keyword clusters. Based on the targeted attack
model, Cache Controller applies certain constraints to flush
the cache. Once the constraints on a cluster are met, Cache
Controller also notifies Padding Controller for padding. In
particular, Padding Controller adds bogus (w, id) pairs to
make the keywords in this cluster have equal frequency.
Then it encrypts and inserts all those real and bogus index
entries as a data collection in a batch manner to EDB.
Meantime, both real and bogus documents are encrypted
and uploaded to EDB.
4During search, C receives a query keyword. On the one
hand, it retrieves the local results from Cache Controller, since
some index entries might have not been sent to EDB yet. On
the other hand, C sends a query token generated from this
keyword to S to retrieve the rest of the encrypted results.
After decryption, C filters padding and combines the result
set with the local one. For security, C will not generate
query tokens against the data collection which is currently
in streaming; this constraint enforces S to query over data
collections which are already inserted to EDB. Following
the setting of SSE [10], [20], search is performed over the
encrypted index entries in EDB, and document identifiers
are pseudo-random strings. In response to query, S will
return the encrypted documents via recovered identifiers in
the result set after search.
Apart from padding countermeasures, ShieldDB pro-
vides several other salient features. First, it realises for-
ward privacy (an advanced notion of SSE) for the stream-
ing operation. Our realisation is customised for efficient
batch insertion and can prevent S from searching the data
collection in streaming. Second, ShieldDB integrates the
functionality of re-encryption. Within this operation, index
entries in a targeted cluster are fetched back to P and the
redundant padding is removed. At the same time, deletion
can be triggered, where the deleted index entries issued and
maintained at P are removed and will not be re-inserted.
After that, real entries combing with new bogus entries are
re-encrypted and inserted to EDB. Third, Cache Controller
can issue a secure flushing operation before meeting the
constraints for padding. This reduces the overhead of P
while preserving the security of padding.
Remark: ShieldDB assigns P for key generation and man-
agement, and P issues the key for C to query. In our
current implementation, P and C use the same key for index
encryption, just as most SSE schemes do. This is practical
because SSE index only stores pseudorandom identifies of
documents, and documents can separately be encrypted via
other encryption algorithms. Note that advanced key man-
agement schemes of SSE [21], [22] can readily be adapted;
yet, this is not our focus.
3.2 Attack Models
ShieldDB mainly considers a passive adversary who mon-
itors the server’s memory access and the communication
between the server and other participants. Following the
assumption of the count attack [12], the adversary has access
to the background knowledge of the dataset and aims to
exploit this information with the access pattern in search
operations to recover query keywords. In this paper, we
extend this attack model to the dynamic (streaming) setting.
Before elaborating the attack models, we define the
streaming model. In our system, streaming performs batch
insertion on a collection of encrypted keyword and docu-
ment identifier (w, id) pairs. Giving a number of continuous
streaming operations, encrypted collections are added to
a sequence over time. Accordingly, S orders the sequence
of data collections by the timestamp. We define the gap
between any two consecutive timestamps is a time interval
t, and C is allowed to search at any time interval. Note that
at a given t, S can only perform search operations against
the collections that have been completely inserted to EDB.
In the dynamic setting, we observe two attack models,
which we refer to as non-persistent and persistent adver-
saries, respectively.
• Non-persistent adversary: This adversary controls S
within one single arbitrary time interval ti, where i is
a system parameter that monotonically increases and
i ≥ 0. During ti, she observes query tokens that C
issued to S, and the access patterns returned by S. She
knows the accumulated (not separate) knowledge of
the document sets inserted from t0 to ti.
• Persistent adversary: This adversary controls S
across multiple arbitrary time intervals, for example,
from t0 to ti. She persistently observes query tokens
and access patterns at those intervals, and knows the
separate knowledge of the document sets inserted
from t0 to ti.
For both attack models, S cannot obtain the query tokens
against the encrypted data collections streamed in the cur-
rent time interval. It is enforced by our streaming operation
with forward privacy, which will later be introduced in
Section 5.3.
Real-world implication of the adversaries: We stress that
non-persistent adversary could be any external attackers,
e.g., hackers or organised cyber criminals. They might com-
promise the server at a certain time window. We also assume
that this adversary could obtain a snapshot of the database
via public channels, e.g., a prior data breach [8]. Because the
database is changed dynamically, the snapshot might only
reflect some historical state of the database. On the contrary,
the persistent adversary is more powerful and could be
database administrators or insiders of an enterprise. They
might have long term access to the server and could obtain
multiple snapshots of the database via internal channels.
Other threats: Apart from the above adversaries,
ShieldDB considers another specific rational adversary [13]
who can inject documents to compromise query privacy. As
mentioned, this threat can be mitigated via forward privacy
SSE. Note that ShieldDB currently does not address an ac-
tive adversary who sabotages the search results. This threat
can be addressed by verifiable SSE schemes [23], [24]; they
are built on authenticated data structures and cryptographic
accumulators, and can naturally be integrated to SSE.
4 STRAWMAN APPROACH
This section introduces a strawman approach of designing
ShieldDB. It serves as a stepping stone to illustrate the data
structures and protocols in our system. Then we evaluate
this approach from security and performance aspects to
motivate our design intuitions of padding countermeasures.
ShieldDB adapts an encrypted map proposed by Cash et
al. [17] as the underlying data structure. It is compatible and
can directly be deployed to the existing key-value store for
a wide range of applications. In setup, App Controller gen-
erates private keys k1 and k2 for indexing and encryption,
and Cache Controller initialises an empty set L with capacity
|L| for caching. Then Padding Controller initialises an empty
set ST to track the states of keywords, and generates bogus
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Padding service:
1: {k1, k2} $←− {0, 1}λ;
2: Initialise a map L with size |L|;
3: Initialise maps st and M ;
4: Initialise a bogus document set B;
Server:
5: Initialise a map E;
Streaming
Padding service:
1: while L is full do
2: foreach w ∈ L do
3: while DB(w) < cmax do
// cmax is the maximum size of the
matching lists in L
4: add padding (w′, id′) from B;
5: end while
6: foreach (w, id) do
7: kw ← F (k1, w);
8: kid ← F (k2, w);
9: if st[w] 6= ⊥ then
10: cw ← st[w];
11: else
12: cw ← 0;
13: end if
14: u← H1(c ‖ kw);
15: v ← H2(c ‖ kid)⊕ id;
16: M ←M ∪ (u, v);
17: st[w]← cw + 1;
18: end foreach
19: end foreach
20: Send M to server;
21: end while
Server:
22: foreach (u, v) in M do
23: E[u] = v;
24: end foreach
Search
Client:
1: kw ← F (k1, w);
2: kid ← F (k2, w);
3: Send (kw, kid) to Server
Server:
4: Initialise a set R;
5: for c = 0 until E returns ⊥ do
6: (u, v)← (H1(c ‖ kw), E[u]);
7: id← v ⊕H2(c ‖ kid);
8: R← R ∪ {id};
9: c← c+ 1;
10: end for
11: Send R to client
Client:
12: Search w in L and combine R.
Fig. 2: Protocols in the strawman approach
documents for padding. Also, S initialises an empty map E
in EDB. Given an incoming document, App Controller parses
it as (w, id) pairs and caches them at L. Once L is full, Cache
Controller pushes all cached items to Padding Controller.
During streaming, Padding Controller introduces bogus
(w′, id′) pairs to make all keywords in L have equal num-
ber of matched documents, i.e., the maximum size of the
matching lists in those keywords. For each real/ bogus pair,
it is encrypted as (H1(cw||F (k1, w)), H2(cw||F (k2, w))⊕id),
where F is a pseudo-random function, H1 and H2 are
cryptographic hash functions, and cw is the state of w, i.e.,
a counter starting from 0. After padding and encryption,
all the encrypted pairs are inserted to E in a batch. Note
that batch insertion is to facilitate padding countermeasures.
If documents are separately indexed and inserted, unique
access patterns can be created in later searches.
During search, C generates a token (F (k1, w), F (k2, w))
from query keyword w. Upon receiving the token, S re-
trieves the result ids via the symmetric way of encryption.
H1(cw||F (k1, w)) is used to find matched entries inE, while
H2(cw||F (k2, w)) is used for decryption to get the result id.
Meanwhile, C searches w in L and combines the local results
with the ones from S.
To enable C to differentiate bogus ids from real ids, we
define the space of id as [0, z], where the space for real id
is [0, x), the space for bogus id is [x, z], and the bit length
of each id is log2 z. Then a pseudo-random identifier can be
derived from a pseudo-random permutation with input id,
which can later be reversed. For ease of the presentation, we
skip the above procedure and assume it is a system function.
Issues: The strawman design only maintains one single
cache for batch streaming. As long as its capacity is full, P
pushes all (w, id) pairs from cache for padding. We note that
this approach may introduce large padding overhead and
even break the effectiveness of padding against the attack
models in the dynamic setting.
The keywords in the current batch could be associated to
different numbers of matched documents. To avoid unique
access patterns, the number of (w, id)’s for each keyword
should be identical after padding. Namely, the size of the
matching lists for each keyword needs to be padded to
the maximum one. However, the size of the above lists
in streaming would vary greatly, thereby incurring large
amount of padding. Regarding security, in the context of
streaming, not all the keywords in the keyword space might
appear in every batch. As a result, the unique access pattern
is very likely to be created if the padding strategy does not
consider the change of the database state over the time.
5 DESIGN OF SHIELDDB
In this section, we present the detailed design of ShieldDB.
First, we introduce how to manage the keywords and cache
during the setup phase. The goal is to facilitate padding
and reduce the padding overhead. Second, we introduce
padding strategies against two types of adversaries in the
streaming context. Third, we implement some advanced
features to further improve the security and efficiency.
5.1 Setup
During setup, ShieldDB invokes Cache Controller to initialise
the cache for batch insertion, and Padding Controller to
generate bogus documents for padding.
To reduce the overhead, ShieldDB implements cache
management in a way that it groups keywords with sim-
ilar frequencies together and performs padding at each
individual keyword cluster. This approach is inspired from
existing padding countermeasures in the static setting [12],
[15]. The idea of doing this in a static database is intuitive;
the variance between the result lengths of keywords with
similar frequencies is small, which can minimize the number
of bogus entries added to the database. We note that it is
also reasonable in the dynamic setting, where the keyword
frequencies in specific applications can be stable in the long
run. If a keyword is popular, it is likely to appear frequently
during streaming, and vice versa. Therefore, we assume that
6there exists a sample dataset, where the keyword frequen-
cies are close to the real ones during streaming. Such a
sample dataset can be provided or collected at the trial stage
of the application.
We implement a heuristic algorithm for keyword
clustering. Given the keywords of a sample dataset
{w1, w2, ..., wl}, they are in ascending order via their fre-
quency fwi for i ∈ [1, l]. Initially, Cache Controller partitions
them as [(w1, . . . , wi) , (wi+1, . . . , wj) , . . . , (wk, . . . , wl)]
and the minimum size of each group α is subjected to α ≥ 2.
For security, the keyword frequency in each cluster after
padding should be the same, i.e., the maximum one, and
thus Cache Controller computes the padding overhead γ as
follows:
γ =
(
i ∗ fwi −
i∑
t=1
fwt
)
+
(
(j − i) ∗ fwj −
j∑
t=i+1
fwt
)
+
. . .+
(
(l − k − 1) ∗ fwl −
l∑
t=k
fwt
)
This algorithm iteratively evaluates γ for every combination
of the partition, and determines the clusters if γ is the
smallest. After that, the controller allocates the capacity of
the cache based on the aggregated keyword frequencies of
each cluster, i.e., |L|
i∑
t=1
fwt , |L|
j∑
t=i+1
fwt , . . ., |L|
l∑
t=k
fwt ,
where |L| is the total capacity assigned for the local cache.
After that, Padding Controller initialises a bogus dataset
B with size |B|, where the number of bogus keyword/id
pairs for each keyword w is determined via the frequency,
i.e., |B|(fwi − fw), and fwi is the maximum frequency
in the cluster of w. The reason of doing so still follows
the assumption in cache allocation. If the keyword is less
frequent in a cluster, it needs more bogus pairs to achieve
the maximum result length after padding, comparing other
keywords with higher frequency, and vice versa. Then the
controller generates bogus index pairs. Once the bogus pairs
for a certain keyword wi is run out, the controller is invoked
again to generate padding for it through the same way.
Remark: We assume that the distribution of the sample
dataset is close to the one of the streaming data in the long
run. Yet, it is non-trivial to obtain optimal padding overhead
in the dynamic setting due to the variation of streaming
documents in different time intervals. Nevertheless, if the
distribution of the database varies during the runtime, the
keyword clustering can be re-invoked based on the up-
to-date streaming data (e.g., in a sliding window), and
the cache can be re-allocated. Besides, our re-encryption
operation can further reduce the padding overhead, which
will be introduced later in Section 5.3.
5.2 Padding Strategies
After setup, documents are continuously collected and
parsed as keyword/id pairs cached at their corresponding
clusters. Once a cluster is full, the streaming operation is
invoked. Then Padding Controller adapts the corresponding
padding strategy to the targeted adversary, encrypts and
inserts all real and bogus pairs to EDB in a batch man-
ner. Next, we present the padding strategies against the
non-persistent and persistent adversaries, respectively. The
Algorithm 1: Padding strategies
1 function Padding()
Input : M = {(w, id)}: entries for streaming,
{L1, · · · , Lm}: cache clusters,
ST : a map that tracks keyword states,
B: bogus document set;
mode: padding mode (high or low);
Output: V : a set of real and bogus entries
2 push entries in M to {L1, · · · , Lm};
3 if padding against non-persistent adverdary then
4 for cluster Li ∈ {L1, · · · , Lm} do
5 if Li.capacity() = full then
6 ∀w ∈ Li;
7 if ST [w].f lag = false then
8 skip padding for w; //no occurred yet
9 end
10 Mi ← PaddingByMode(Li, ST,B,mode);
11 add Mi to V ;
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 if padding against persistent adverdary then
16 for cluster Li ∈ {L1, · · · , Lm} do
17 if first batch && ST [w].f lag = true, ∀w ∈ Li
then
18 Mi ← PaddingByMode(Li, ST,B,mode);
19 add Mi to V ;
20 else if Li.capacity() = full then
21 Mi ← PaddingByMode(Li, ST,B,mode);
22 add Mi to V ;
23 end
24 end
25 end
26 return V ;
sketch of the padding function is given in Algorithms 1
and 2. Note that Padding Controller will also upload bogus
and real documents in the batch. For simplicity, we do not
include this operation in our algorithm. We mainly focus on
the protection of the access pattern to the encrypted index.
Padding strategy against non-persistent adversary: Recall
that this adversary controls S within a certain time interval
t. From the high level point of view, an effective padding
strategy should ensure that all keywords occurred in EDB
at t do not have unique result lengths. There are two chal-
lenges to achieve this goal. First, t can be an arbitrary time
interval. Therefore, the above guarantee needs to be held
at any certain time interval. Second, not all the keywords
in the keyword space would appear at each time interval.
It is non-trivial to deal with this situation to preserve the
security of padding.
To address the above challenges, ShieldDB programs
Padding Controller to track the states of keywords over the
time intervals from the beginning. Specifically, each key-
word state includes two components, a flag that indicates
whether the keyword has existed before in the streamed
documents, and a counter that presents the number of total
real and bogus (w, id) pairs in EDB of the keyword. Based
on the states of keywords, Padding Controller performs the
7Algorithm 2: Padding modes
1 function PaddingByMode(Li, ST, P,mode)
Input : Li: cluster for padding,
ST : a map that tracks keyword states,
B: bogus dataset;
mode: padding mode (high or low)
Output: Mi: a set of real and bogus entries
2 Mi ← ∅;
3 stmax ← max{ST [w].c}, ∀w ∈ Li;
4 if mode = high then
5 cw ← stmax + cmax; // cmax is the maximum size
of keyword matching lists in Li
6 ∀ w ∈ Li:
7 add cw − c bogus entries from B to Mi; // c is the
size of matching list for w in Li
8 ST [w].c← cw;
9 else
10 // mode is low
11 cw ← stmax + cmin; // cmin is the minimum size
of keyword matching lists in Li
12 ∀ w ∈ Li:
13 add cw − cmin bogus entries from B to Mi;
14 ST [w].c← cw;
15 end
16 return Mi;
following actions. If the keyword has not existed yet, the
controller will not pad this keyword even its cluster is full.
The reason is that the adversary might also know the infor-
mation of keyword existence. If C queries a keyword which
does not exist, S should return an empty set. Otherwise, the
adversary can identify the token of this keyword if padded.
Accordingly, only when a keyword appears at the first time,
padding over this keyword will be invoked. After that, if the
keywords in a cluster all exist, no matter a keyword exists
in a certain time interval or not, padding will be added to
ensure that all keywords in the cluster always have the same
result length at any following time interval.
Padding strategy against persistent adversary: Recall that
this adversary can monitor the database continuously and
obtain multiple references of the database across multiple
time intervals. Likewise, the padding strategy against the
persistent adversary should ensure that all keywords have
no unique access pattern in all time intervals from the very
beginning. However, directly using the strategy against the
non-persistent adversary does not address the leakage of
keyword existence. Let us demonstrate this issue with an
example. Below are a sequence of streaming and search
operations across two consecutive time intervals:
t0: streaming ({(w1,id1), (w1,id2), (w2,id2), (w2,id′1)});
t1: search(w1), search(w2);
t2: streaming ({(w1,id3), (w2,id3), (w3,id3), (w3,id′2),
(w3,id′3});
t3: search(w1), search(w2), search(w3).
Considering that w1, w2, and w3 are in the same cluster,
and Padding Controller utilises bogus id′1, id
′
2, and id
′
3 to
ensure that these keywords have the same search result
length after batch insertion at either t0 or t2. It is effective
to defend against the non-persistent adversary, because she
can only control at either t1 or t3. However, the persistent
adversary can figure out w3 is the only new keyword. The
reason is that she might know the states of the database at
all the four time intervals; namely, she knows w3 is the new
keyword inserted in t2 and identifies the query token of w3
in t3.
To address this issue, Padding Controller is programmed
to enforce another necessary constraint to invoke padding.
That is, all keywords in the cluster at the first batch have
to exist before streaming. As a tradeoff, Cache Controller has
to hold all the pairs in the cluster even the cache is full, if
there are still keywords yet to appear. In Algorithm 1, the
existence of all keywords in the first batch is checked. For
subsequent batches of the cluster, the padding constraint
follows the same strategy for the non-persistent adversary.
We name this additional constraint as first batch condition.
Padding modes: ShieldDB implements two modes for
padding, i.e., high and low modes. These two modes are de-
scribed in Algorithm 2. In the high mode, once the constraint
for the cache of a cluster is met, the keywords to be padded
have the maximum result length of keywords in this cluster.
Accordingly, the cache can be emptied since all entries are
sent to Padding Controller for streaming. On the contrary,
the low mode is invoked in a way that the keywords to be
padded have the minimum result length of keywords in
this cluster. Therefore, some entries of keywords might still
be remained in the cache. Yet, this mode only introduces
necessarily minimum padding for keywords which do not
occur in each time interval. The two modes have their own
merits. The high mode consumes a larger amount of padding
and execution time for padding and encryption, but it
reduces the load of cache in P. The low mode introduces
relatively less padding overhead but heavier load of P.
Security guarantees: Our padding countermeasures ensure
that no unique access pattern exists for keywords which
have occurred in EDB. For the persistent adversary, the
padding countermeasure also ensures that the keyword
occurrence is hidden across multiple time intervals. Note
that padding not only protects the result lengths of queries,
but also introduces false counts in keyword co-occurrence
matrix, which further increases the efforts of the count
attack. Regarding the formal security definition, we follow a
notion recently proposed by Bost et al. [15] for SSE schemes
with padding countermeasures. This notion captures the
background knowledge of the adversary and formalises the
security strength of padding. That is, given any sequence
of query tokens, it is efficient to find another same-sized
sequence of query tokens with identical leakage. We extend
this notion to make the above condition hold in the dynamic
setting in Section 6.
Remark: Our proposed padding strategies are different
from the approach proposed by Bost et al. [15], which
merely groups keywords into clusters and pads them to
the same result length for a static database. Directly adapt-
ing their approach for different batches of incoming docu-
ments will fail to address persistent or even non-persistent
adversaries. The underlying reason is that the above ap-
proach treats each batch individually, while the states of
database are accumulated. Effective padding strategies in
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Client:
1: {k1, k2} $←− {0, 1}λ;
2: Initialise maps {L1, · · · , Lm};
3: Initialise maps st and M ;
4: Initialise a bogus document set B;
Server:
5: Initialise a map E;
Streaming
Padding service:
1: padding();
2: Select L ∈ {L1, · · · , Lm} with
padding;
3: foreach w in L do
4: ke
$←− {0, 1}λ;
6: kw ← F (k1, w);
7: kid ← F (k2, w);
8: if ST [w] 6= ⊥ then
9: (stwb−1 , cwb−1)← ST [w];
10: else
11: stw0
$←− {0, 1}λ, cw0 ← 0;
12: end if
13: stwb ← G(ke, stwb−1);
14: ST [w]← (stwb , cwb);
15: i← 0;
16. foreach id that matches w do
17: u← H1(F (stwb , i) ‖ kw);
18: v ← H2(F (stwb , i) ‖ kid)⊕ id;
19: M ←M ∪ (u, v);
20: i← i+ 1;
21: end foreach
22: uwb ← H1(F (stwb , cwb) ‖ kw);
23: vwb ← H2(F (stwb , cwb) ‖ kid)
⊕ (ke ‖ cwb−1);
24: M ←M ∪ (uwb , vwb);
25: end foreach
26: Send M to Server;
Server:
27: foreach (u, v) in M do
28: E[u] = v;
29: end foreach
Search
Client:
1: if ST [w] 6= ⊥ then
2: kw ← F (k1, w);
3: kid ← F (k2, w);
4: (stwb , cwb)← ST [w];
5: Send (kw, kid, stwb , cwb) to server
6: else
7: Search w in L, return R;
8: end if
Server:
9: R← ∅, sti ← stwb , ci ← cwb ;
10: while ci 6= 0 do
11: for j = 0 to ci − 1 do
12: u← H1(F (sti, j) ‖ kw)
13: v ← E[u]
14: id← v ⊕H2(F (sti, j) ‖ kid);
15: R← R ∪ (u, v);
16: end for
17: uk ← H1(F (sti, ci) ‖ kw);
18: vk ← E[uk];
19: (ki ‖ ci−1)← vk ⊕
H2(F (sti, ci) ‖ kid)
20: sti−1 ← P−1(ki, sti)
21: sti ← sti−1, ci ← ci−1;
22: end while
23: send R to Client
Client:
24: Search w in L, combine with R.
Fig. 3: Protocols in ShieldDB. In Streaming, ke is an ephemeral key generated for every batch insertion. cwb and stwb present
the result length and the state of w in the current batch b respectively. The result length of w in the previous batch cwb−1 is
embedded in vwb . In Search, sti and ci present the current state and the result length of w in batch i.
the dynamic setting must consider the accumulated states
of the database so that the adversaries can be addressed in
arbitrary time intervals.
5.3 Other Features
ShieldDB provides several other salient features to enhance
its security, efficiency, and functionality.
Forward privacy: First of all, ShieldDB realises the notion of
forward privacy [18], [19] to protect the newly added doc-
uments and mitigate the injection attacks [13]. In particular,
our system customises an efficient SSE scheme with forward
privacy [19] to our context of batch insertion. This scheme
is built on symmetric-key based trapdoor permutation and
is faster than the public-key based solution [18]. But the
ephemeral key of permutation needs to be embedded inside
the index entry to recover the state of the previous entry. To
reduce the computation and storage overhead, we propose
to link a master state to a set of entries with the same key-
word in the batch. All counters associated with the entries
are derived from the master state. The detailed algorithm
for encryption and search can be found in Figure 3.
Another benefit of our design is that S can be enforced
to perform search operations over the completed batches.
The batches which are still transmitted on the fly cannot be
queried without the latest keyword state from C.
Re-encryption and deletion: ShieldDB also implements
the re-encryption operation. This operation is periodically
conducted over a certain keyword cluster. P first fetches all
entries in this cluster stored in EDB from S. After that, P
removes all bogus entries and re-performs the padding over
this cluster of keywords. All the real and bogus entires are
then encrypted via a fresh key, and inserted back to EDB.
The benefits of re-encryption are two-fold: (1) redundant
bogus entries in this cluster can be eliminated; and (2) the
leakage function can be reset to protect the search and access
patterns. During re-encryption, ShieldDB can also execute
deletion. A list of deleted document ids is maintained at
P, and the deleted entries are physically removed from the
cluster before padding.
Cache flushing: In the streaming documents, the keywords
in some clusters might not show up frequently. Even the
cache capacity of such clusters is set relatively small, the
constraint might still not be triggered very often. To reduce
the load of the cache at P and improve the streaming
throughput, ShieldDB develops an operation called flushing
to deal with the above “cold” clusters. In particular, Cache
Controller monitors all the caches of clusters, and sets a time
limit to trigger flushing. If a cluster is not full after a period
of this time limit, all entries in this cluster will be sent to
Padding Controller. Note that the padding strategies still need
to be followed for security and the high mode of padding is
applied to empty the cache.
6 SECURITY OF SHIELDDB
ShieldDB implements a dynamic searchable encryption
scheme Σ = (Setup,Streaming,Search), consisting of three
protocols between a padding service P , a storage server S,
and an querying client C . A database DBt = (wi, idi)
|DBt|
i=1
is defined as a tuple of keyword and document id pairs with
wi ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and idi ∈ {0, 1}l at the time interval t ≥ 0.
9Setup(DB0) is a protocol that takes as in-
put a database DB0, and outputs a tuple of
(k1, k2, {L1, . . . , Lm}, st, B,EDB0), where k1, k2 are
secret keys to encrypt keywords and document ids, a set
{L1, . . . , Lm} contains cache clusters, st maintains keyword
states, and B is a bogus dataset to be used for padding, and
EDB0 is the encrypted database at t = 0.
Streaming(k1, k2, Lu, st, B, {(wi, idi)}; EDBt−1, {(ui, vi)})
is a protocol between P with inputs k1,k2, and Lu
(1 ≤ u ≤ m) the cache cluster to be updated, the states st,
the bogus dataset B, and the set of keyword and document
id pairs {(wi, idi)} to be streamed, and S with input EDBt−1
the encrypted database at time t − 1 (t ≥ 1), and {(ui, vi)}
the set of encrypted keyword and document identifier
pairs for batch insertion. Once P uploads {(ui, vi)} to S,
st and B gets updated, Lu is reset. At S, once EDBt−1 gets
updated by {(ui, vi)}, it changes to EDBt.
Search(k1, k2, q, st; EDBt) is a protocol between C with
the keys k1, k2, the query q querying the matching doc-
uments of a single keyword wi, and the state st, and S
with EDBt. Meanwhile, C queries P for retrieving cached
documents of the query keyword.
The security of ShieldDB can be quantified via a leakage
function L = (LStp,LStream,LSrch). It defines the informa-
tion exposed in Setup, Streaming, and Search, respectively.
The function ensures that ShieldDB does not reveal any
information beyond the one that can be inferred from LStp,
LStream, and LSrch.
In Setup, LStp = |EDB0| presenting the size of EDB0, i.e.,
the number of encrypted keyword and document id pairs.
In Streaming, ShieldDB is forward private as presented
in Streaming protocol in Figure 3. Hence LStream can be
written as
LStream({(w, id)}) = L′({id})
where {(w, id)} denotes a batch of keyword and id pairs w,
and L′ is a stateless function. Hence, LStream only reveals
the number of pairs to be added to EDB. ShieldDB does
not leak any information about the updated keywords. In
particular, S cannot learn that the newly inserted documents
match a keyword that being previously queried.
In Search, LSrch reveals common leakage functions [25]:
the access pattern ap and the search pattern sp as follows.
The ap reveals the encrypted matching document iden-
tifiers associated with search tokens. For instance, if an
adversary controls EDBt, she monitors the search query list
Qt = {q1, . . . , qn−1} by the time order. Then, ap(qi) (with
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) for a query keyword wi is presented as
ap(qi) = EDB(wi) = {(uwi , vwi)}
where uwi and vwi are an encrypted keyword and document
id entry associated with wi in EDBt.
The sp leaks the repetition of search tokens sent by C to
S, and hence, the repetition of queried keywords in those
search tokens.
sp(qi) = {∀j 6= i, qj ∈ Qt, wj = wi}
Next, we detail the leakage during the interaction be-
tween C and S over Qt on a given DBt. We call an instantia-
tion of interaction as a history Ht = (DBt, q1, . . . , qn−1). We
note that the states of keywords in DBt do not change during
these queries. The leakage function of Ht is presented as
L(Ht) = (|EDB(wi)|, . . . , |EDB(wn−1)|, α(Ht), σ(Ht))
where |EDB(wi)| (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) is the number of matching
documents associated with the keyword wi mapping to
the query qi, α(Ht) = {ap(q1), . . . , ap(qn−1)} is the access
pattern induced by Qt, and σ(Ht) is a symmetric binary
matrix such that for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1, the element at ith
row and jth column is 1 if wi = wj , and 0 otherwise.
Constrainted security: Here, we define constraints to for-
malise that the a history conforms to the information known
by the non-persistent adversary at the time she launches
an attack. This constraint definition follows the constraint
definition proposed by Bost et al. [15]. In details, we want to
represent that DBt and the list of queries Qt are known by
the adversary. We use a predicate over histories: the history
Ht satisfies the constraint C if C(Ht) = true.
Definition 1. A constraint set C = (C0, C1, . . . , Cn−1) over a
database DBt and a query setQt = {q1, . . . , qn−1}, is a sequence
of algorithms such that, C∗(DBt) = (flag0, st0), where flag0
is true or false and st0 captures C0’s state, and for q
∈ Qt, Ci(q, flagi−1, sti−1) = (flagi, sti). The constraint is
consistent ifCi(., false, .) = (false, .) (the constraint remains
false if it once evaluates to false).
For a history Ht = (DBt, q1, . . . , qn−1), we note C(H) the
evaluation of
C(Ht) := Cn−1(qn−1, Cn−2(. . . , C0(DBt))).
If C(Ht) = true, we say that H satisfies C. A constraint set C is
valid if there exists two different efficiently constructable histories
H and H′ satisfying C.
The validity of the constraint allows to formalise the
fact that the adversary knows DBt throughout the queries
within the time interval t. Hence, the existence of multiple
histories satisfying C is essential for the acceptable security.
We formalise it as follows.
Definition 2. A constraint set C is L-acceptable for some
leakage L if, for every efficiently computable history H0t =
(DB0t , q
0
1 , . . . , q
0
n−1) satisfying C, there exists an efficiently com-
putable H1t 6= H0t satisfying C, for H1t = (DB1t , q11 , . . . , q1n−1),
such that L(H0t ) = L(H1t ).
Let ∆0 = {w01, . . . , w0n−1} present the keyword space
of DB0t , and ∆
1 = {w′1, . . . , w1n−1} similarly be the key-
word space of DB1t , Definition 2 shows that the condition
L(H0t ) = L(H1t ) implies ∆0 = ∆1, and ∀w0i ∈ ∆, w1i ∈
∆1, fw0i = fw1i , where fw0i denotes the frequency of w
0
i ,
(i.e. the number of distinct documents that contain w0i ). The
databases DB0t and DB
1
t have the identical set of keywords
and that set is known by the adversary. If the set is not the
same for each one, querying a non-existed keyword in one
of the databases will cause the difference in access pattern
between the databases. Hence, the leakage of those histories
will not be the same. The frequency condition, fw0i = fw1i ,
ensures that the adversary receives the identical number of
matching documents when she executes queries q0i and q
1
i
over DB0t and DB
1
t , respectively.
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6.1 Security against Non-persistent Adversary
In this section, we use the constraint set C to define the
security game for the non-persistent adversary of a scheme
Σ = (Setup,Search) as follows. The adversary selects two
different databases DB0t and DB
1
t , and gives them to a
challenger. Let ∆0 = {w01, . . . , w0n−1} be the keyword space
of DB0t , and ∆
1 = {w11, . . . , w1n−1} be the keyword space
of DB1t . Then, the challenger randomly picks one of the
database and runs a setup protocol to generate EDBt. Then,
the adversary sends queries to the challenger to receive the
search results. The scheme is secure if the adversary cannot
correctly guess the picked database and query keywords
with a non-negligible probability in security parameter λ.
This security game is formalised in Definition 3.
Definition 3. Let Σ = (Setup,Search) be the SSE scheme of
ShieldDB, λ be the security parameter, and A be a non-persistent
adversary. Let L be a leakage function, and C = (C0, . . . , Cn−1)
be a set of L-acceptable constraints. Let IndSSE,A,L,C be the
following game:
IndSSE,A,L,C(λ) Game:
b
$←− {0, 1}
(C0,DB0t ,DB
1
t )← A(1λ)
(K,EDBbt)← Setup(DBbt)
(C1, q
0
1 , q
1
1)← A(EDBbt)
τ b1 ← Query(qb1)
for i = 2 to n− 1 do
(Ci, q
0
i , q
1
i )← A(qbi−1)
τ bi ← Query(qbi )
end for
b′ ← A(τ bn)
if b = b′ return 1, otherwise return 0
where τ bi ← Query(qbi ) presents the transcript of the query
qbi , and with the restriction that, for H
0
t = (DB
0
t , q
0
1 , . . . , q
0
n−1),
and H1t = (DB
1
t , q
1
1 , . . . , q
1
n−1),
• C(H0t ) = C(H
1
t ) = true
• L(H0t ) = L(H1t )
We say that Σ is L-constrained-adaptively-indistinguishable
if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversary A,
AdvIndA,L,C(λ) =∣∣P[IndSSE,A,L,C(λ) = 1]− 1
2
∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
We underline again that the constraint C can be seen
as information the adversary knows about the histories,
including the keyword space, and the frequencies of key-
words in that keyword space. In addition, we stress that the
states of the keywords in that space are unchanged over the
queries qbi (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1). Then, we can prove the
following theorem by analysing the transcripts τ0i and τ
1
i .
Theorem 1. Let Σ = (Setup,Search) be our SSE scheme, and C
a set of knowledge constraints. If Σ is L-constrained-adaptively-
indistinguishable secure, and C is either L-acceptable, then Σ is
(L,C)-constrained-adaptively-indistinguishability secure.
Proof. In Definition 3, we can see that the adversary receives
the transcript τ bi when she sends the query q
b
i to the chal-
lenger. Hence, to prove the indistinguishbility between DB0t
and DB1t , we start investigating the query keyword wi of
qbi for all i
th query (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1). This analysis will
help to investigate τ bi whenwi is non-existed/existed in DB
b
t
as follows. We also recall that L(H0t ) = L(H1t ). Hence, the
existance of wi in DB0t and DB
1
t is identical due to ∆
0 = ∆1.
If wi 6∈ ∆b, we can easily see that both DB0t and DB1t are
indistinguishable since ap(q0i ) = ap(q
1
i ) =⊥.
If wi ∈ ∆b, we can also see that ap(q0i ) = ap(q0i ) since
fw0i = fw1i . Hence, DB
0
t and DB
1
t are also indistinguishable
upon the queries q0i and q
1
i .
The above analysis of wi’s existence can be applied
to keywords of the next queries in the sequence of
{qbi+1, . . . , qbn−1}. Eventually, DB0t and DB1t are indistin-
guishable under the adversary’s view.
6.2 Security against Persistent Adversary
In this section, we also use the constraint set C to define the
security game for the persistent adversary. We recall that a
persistent adversary monitors the communication between
the padding service, query client, and the server over time.
Hence, she obtains both LStream and LSrch caused by
streaming and search queries, respectively. An query can be
written as op, where op can be u (streaming) or q (search).
Note that u streams a pair of (w, id). Although our system
performs batch insertion, the adversary can still see that
every encrypted entry is inserted orderly.
The security of a scheme Σ = (Setup,Stream,Search)
against the persistent adversary is defined as follows. The
adversary selects two different databases DB00 and DB
1
0, and
gives them to a challenger. Let ∆0 = {w01, . . . , w0n−1} be the
keyword space of DB00, and ∆
1 = {w11, . . . , w1n−1} be the
keyword space of DB10. Then, the challenger randomly picks
one of the database and runs a setup protocol to generate
EDBb0, with b ∈ {0, 1}. After that, the adversary sends
queries to the challenger to update the EDB and to receive
search results. The scheme is secure if the adversary cannot
correctly guess the picked database and query keywords
with a non-negligible probability in security paramter λ.
This security game is formalised in Definition 4.
Definition 4. Let Σ = (Setup,Streaming,Search) be the SSE
scheme of ShieldDB, λ be the security parameter, and A be a
persistent adversary. Let L be a leakage function, and C =
(C0, C1, . . . , Cn) be a set of L-acceptable constraints. Let u be
a streaming query, q be a search query, and op be either u or q.
Let IndSSE,A,L,C be the following game:
IndSSE,A,L,C(λ) Game:
b
$←− {0, 1}
(C0,DB00,DB
1
0)← A(1λ)
(K,EDBb0)← Setup(DBb0)
for i = 0 to n− 1 do
(op0i , op
1
i )← A(EDBbi )
if opbi = u
b
i
EDBbi ← Streaming(ubi )
else if opbi = q
b
i
τ bi ← Query(qbi )
end for
b′ ← A(τ bn)
if b = b′ return 1, otherwise return 0
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where τ bi ← Query(qbi ) presents the transcript of the query
qbi , and with the restriction that, for all H
0
i = (DB
0
i , q
0
i ), and
H1i = (DB
1
i , q
1
i ),
• C(H0i ) = C(H
1
i ) = true
• L(H0i ) = L(H1i )
We say that Σ is L-constrained-adaptively-indistinguishable
if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversary A,
AdvIndA,L,C(λ) =∣∣P[IndSSE,A,L,C(λ) = 1]− 1
2
∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
We stress that the search query qbi only queries against
the data that have been updated completedly in EDBbi . If
the server has not finished updating the cluster contain-
ing ui into EDBbi , the result of qi does not include the
id from ui. Since the adversary sends u0i , and u
1
i to the
challenger, she knows the keyword to be streamed. That
are (w0i , id) and (w
1
i , id). Hence, we underline the condition
C(H0i ) = C(H
1
i ) = true to stress that she knows the
information of the histories, including the keyword space
and the frequencies of keywords at time i. We note that
∆0 = ∆1 during setup, as extracted from a training data
set. These keyword spaces are also unchanged throughout
time intervals i ∈ [0, n]. However, the states of keywords are
changed due to streaming queries ui. Hence, we prove the
following theorem by investigating the transcripts τ0i and
τ1i when ui is executed.
Theorem 2. Let Σ = (Setup,Streaming,Search) be our
SSE scheme, and C a set of knowledge constraints. If Σ
is L-constrained-adaptively-indistinguishable secure, and C is
either L-acceptable, then Σ is (L,C)-constrained-adaptively-
indistinguishability secure.
Proof. We now analyse what the adversary receives when
sending queries ui and qi to the challenger. With the query
ui that streams a pair of (wi, id), we can see that:
If ST [wi].c = 0, presenting that wi appears in the first
time, then Padding Controller checks the cache cluster that
expects to have wi against the first batch condition. The
condition ensures the existence of all keywords in the cluster
before padding. If the condition is fail, we see that both
EDB0i and EDB
1
i are indistinguishable since the challenger
does not send any batch to the server. In contrast, if the
condition is passed, Padding Controller pads all the key-
words in the cluster to be the same length and encrypt
them before sending a batch to the server. Meanwhile,
ST [wi].c gets updated. Accordingly, EDB0i and EDB
1
i are
also indistinguishable because these databases receive the
batch of keywords that have the same length. The first batch
condition is crucical when ShieldDB is against the persistent
adversary. It ensures there is no new keyword in the cluster
appears in subsequent batches. Hence, the adversary cannot
distinguish when a new keyword is added in EDBbi .
If ST [wi].c > 0 and first batch condition has been
met, Padding Controller performs padding similarly with the
padding strategy against the non-persistent adversary, pre-
sented in Algorithm 1. We can also see that EDB0i and EDB
1
i
are indistinguishable because Padding Controller guarantees
all the keywords in a cluster have the same length.
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Cluster1 Cluster2 ... Clusterm
process-safe
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SE Client
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Fig. 4: Implementation of ShieldDB
Now, we start analysing the query qi that queries the
keyword wi, with ST [wi].c = 0 or ST [wi].c > 0.
If ST [wi].c = 0, the adversary cannot guess the picked
database because τ0i and τ
1
i return nothing.
If ST [wi].c > 0, τ0i and τ
1
i are indistinguishable because
ap(q0i ) = ap(q
1
i ). In addition, querying other keywords in
the same cluster also returns the same length.
7 SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
A simple way to implement the padding service P of
ShieldDB is that Cache Controller and Padding Controller are
maintained synchronously in a single process. That is, Cache
Controller is idle while Padding Controller performs padding
and encryption, and vice versa. Then, encrypted batches
are uploaded to the server S. We observe that this single
process becomes extremely slow in the long run because
Cache Controller and Padding Controller cannot make use of
CPU cores in parallel. As a result, there are a very few
batches uploaded to S.
To address the above bottleneck, we propose Orchestra-
tor, a component bridging data flow between Cache Con-
troller and Padding Controller. Orchestrator enables ShieldDB
to maximise the usage of CPU cores by splitting two con-
trollers to process in parallel. Figure 4 depicts the implemen-
tation of the system. In details, Cache Controller and Padding
Controller are spawned as separate system processes during
setup. Orchestrator acts as an independent proxy manager
managing the cache clusters in P’s shared memory. It pro-
vides process-safe access methods of collecting, clearing,
and updating data in a given cluster.
The communication between Cache Controller and
Padding Controller is performed by sockets during the
streaming operations. Cache Controller acts as a client socket,
and notifies Padding Controller in the order of clusters that
are ready for padding as per padding strategy. Then, Cache
Controller awaits a checksum notified by Padding Controller.
The checksum reports the number of keyword and doc-
ument id pairs in the cached cluster. Note that Padding
Controller only collects necessarily cached data for padding
upon the high or low padding mode.
Apart from these components, ShieldDB contains
Padding Daemon, Streaming Daemon, and SE Client. They are
activated by App Controller during setup. Padding Daemon
provides Padding Controller with the access to a bogus
dataset, and maintains the track of remaining bogus entries
for each keyword. It will generate a new bogus dataset if
it is run out. Streaming Daemon allows App Controller to
setup HTTP request/response methods to S’s address. SE
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Client deploys our encryption protocols at C, as presented
in Figure 3. This service is separated so that later protocol
updates are compatible to other components in the system.
At S, API Provider provides RESTful APIs to serve C’s
HTTP requests. By calling streaming API requests, API
Provider then passes collected batches in streaming to the
EDB Controller. This component executes the insertion pro-
tocol as presented in Figure 3. ShieldDB introduces a compo-
nent called EDB Wrapper, which separates EDB Controller’s
protocols from any database storage technology.
8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
8.1 Setup and Overview
ShieldDB is developed using Python and the code is pub-
lished online1. We use standard packages of Pycrypto (2.6.1)
to implement cryptographic primitives (SHA256 for cryp-
tographic hash functions and AES-128 cipher for pseudo-
random functions) and NLTK (3.3) for textual processing.
We deploy ShieldDB in Azure Cloud and run on an isolated
DS15 v2 instance (Intel Xeon E5-2673 2.4GHz CPU with
20 cores and 140G RAM), where Ubuntu Server 17.1 is
installed. The controllers of the padding service are im-
plemented by using Python multiprocessing package. For
simplicity, we co-locate the client and padding service at
the same instance. At the server side. API Controller works
on top of the Flask-a micro web framework2, while EDB is
realised by RocksDB, a key-value store3.
We select the Enron email data set4, and extract 2,418,270
keyword/document id pairs from the top 5,000 most fre-
quent keywords in the dataset as the keyword space in our
experiment. We group them and allocate the cache capacity
for each keyword cluster based on their frequencies, as
introduced in Section 5.1. Figure 5 presents the normalised
cache capacities of these clusters at different values of α.
Recalled that α indicates the minimum size of keywords
in each cluster. As demonstrated later, a larger α results
in a higher security level, i.e., the longer attack time, but
introduces a larger padding overhead. During the setup,
ShieldDB generates a padding dataset for the keyword set.
In our experiments, the dataset is estimated empirically
enough to be used in streaming data up to 175 seconds for
both α = 256 and α = 512. In details, the dataset contains
1,859,877 bogus pairs (approx. 389 Kilobytes).
To create the streaming scenario, we group every 10
documents as a batch (approx. 560 stemmed keyword/id
pairs) and continuously input such batch to the system.
To faithfully understand the performance of padding, we
deploy the client and server to the same dedicated instance
so that the impact of network I/O is minimised. Note that
we begin to record the performance of ShieldDB after the
cold start period of 75 seconds.
We experiment ShieldDB with different combinatorial
settings of padding strategies and modes. They are denoted
as NH (strategy against non-persistent adversary via high
1. ShieldDB:
https://github.com/MonashCybersecurityLab/ShieldDB
2. Flask microframework: http://flask.pocoo.org
3. RocksDB source: https://rocksdb.org
4. Enron email dataset: online at https://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼.
/enron/
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Fig. 5: Cache capacities
mode), NL (non-persistent padding strategy via low mode),
PH (strategy against persistent adversary via high mode,
and PL (strategy against persistent adversary via low mode).
The performance of ShieldDB is evaluated via a set of
measurements such as system throughput, local cache size,
used bogus pairs, EDB size, and search time. Here, the sys-
tem throughput represents the total accumulated number
of real keyword/id pairs that have been encrypted and
inserted to EDB. In addition, we investigate the performance
of cache flushing and re-encryption operations. Note that
forward privacy is already integrated into our underlying
SSE scheme. To evaluate the effectiveness of our padding
countermeasures, we implement the generalised count at-
tack [12] which can be launched in the situation without
unique access pattern; we evaluate query construction time
against different adversaries. These attacks are deployed to
Azure instances with the same hardware configuration.
8.2 Evaluation
We measure the performance of ShieldDB at both Padding
Service and the untrusted server S over a 175-second stream-
ing period. In details, Fig. 6 summarises the performance of
Padding Service with the three different metrics of accmu-
lated throughput, local cache size, and padding overhead
when setting α = 256 and α = 512. Then, Fig. 7 describes
the performance of S by observing EDB size, search time,
and the average result length of query keywords.
System throughput: We first measure the accumulated
throughput over time when ShieldDB is deployed with
different padding modes of NH (non-persistent using high
padding mode), NL (non-persistent using low padding
mode), PH (persistent using high padding mode), and PL
(persistent using low padding mode). We also monitor the
number of batch insertions and the average batch process-
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Fig. 6: Evaluations on the accumulated throughput, local cache size, and number of used bogus entries, respectively
TABLE 1: Batch processing results
Setting Batch Insertions Avg. time/batch (ms)
α = 256 α = 512 α = 256 α = 512
NH 30 5 7047.2 51384.41
NL 1919 497 113.94 456.87
PH 45 6 5280.58 45734.16
PL 1916 549 138.34 465.09
ing time of Padding Controller to evaluate the throughput
difference between these padding strategies.
Fig. 6 shows that these padding modes have similar
throughput at a lower α = 256. However, the overall
throughput reduces nearly a half when setting α = 512. It
is explained that padding overhead and encryption cost are
higher when more keywords are allocated in each cluster.
Consequently, the throughput will be decreased. Table 1 also
supports that finding when fewer batches are inserted to S
and the average processing time per batch takes a longer
time when setting α = 512.
Furthermore, when setting α = 512, Fig. 6 shows that
low mode promotes more real keyword/id pairs to be in-
serted to EDB than high mode. In details, the throughput of
NL is 1.23 times higher than the throughput of NH, and PL’s
is about 1.51 timer higher than PH’s. Table 1 also supports
this finding when it reports that low mode creates more
batch insertions than high mode, while its average batch
processing time is completely negligible compared to that
value of the latter. This observation shows the efficiency
of low mode since it only performs necessarily minimum
padding for keywords in every batch. In contrast, Padding
Controller takes longer time under high padding mode due
to higher padding overhead and the longer encryption time
taken by the large number of bogus pairs.
Cache size: To investigate the overhead at the padding
service, we monitor the local cache as shown in Fig. 6. In
general, low mode results in a larger number of cached pairs
in cache clusters than high mode, regardless of padding
constraints. The cache in NL consumes 150%∼197% larger
space than the cache in NH. The load of cache in PL is
1.8∼2.5× higher than the load of the cache in PH.
Padding Overhead: We rely on the number of used bogus
entries reported in Fig. 6 to compute the padding overhead
of different combinatorial settings of padding strategies and
modes. The padding overhead is estimated as the ratio
between the bogus and real (throughput) pairs. We see
that although high padding mode achieves a lower load
of cache than low mode, it utilises more bogus pairs from
the generated padding dataset than the latter. In details,
the padding overhead of NH ranges is from 3.8∼4.1 and
from 5.6∼5.8 for α = 256 and α = 512, respectively. In
contrast, the padding overhead of NL ranges is marginal,
varying from 0.07∼0.13 and from 0.06∼0.16 for α = 256
and α = 512, respectively. The reason is that a portion of
streamed keyword/id pairs are still cached at the padding
service. It also demonstrates that when α is large, PH gener-
ates a larger padding overhead than NH does. Specifically,
the padding overhead of PH is in the range 6.4∼8.9 for
α = 512. The reason is that PH will add bogus pairs for
keywords that do not appear in the current time interval,
while NH will not if the keywords have not existed.
EDB size: We report the number of real and bogus pairs
in EDB over the time in Fig. 7. It demonstrates that high
mode generates more data in EDB than low mode due to the
selection of all cached pairs in clusters for padding and the
large number of used bogus pairs.
Search time: To demonstrate the search performance, we
configure the client to query 10% randomly selected key-
words in EDB at timestamps, i.e, t = 75, t = 100, t = 125,
t = 150, and t = 175. Fig. 7 shows that high mode makes
querying a keyword take a longer time, because S decrypts
more bogus pairs. In contrast, the search time in low mode is
shorter due to the fewer used bogus pairs. The search time
in NH and PH is fluctuated due to the change of the result
lengths of keywords in EDB as given in Table 2 and Table 3.
Flushing: We select the two largest cache clusters to simu-
late the flushing operation. In particular, we set a small time
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TABLE 2: Result length
Setting Time intervals
t = 75 t = 100 t = 125 t = 150 t = 175
NH 593.78 669.94 778.45 811.25 903.53
NL 109.856 144.66 164.40 171.56 186.04
PH 562.86 660.22 593.18 579.30 714.12
PL 89.25 82.38 107.92 110.57 126.43
(a) α = 256
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NH NL PH PL TABLE 3: Result length
Setting Time intervals
t = 75 t = 100 t = 125 t = 150 t = 175
NH 668.02 843.22 837.01 840.85 861.44
NL 81.64 140.95 147.73 168.17 174.40
PH 577.06 610.02 614.34 857.73 879.63
PL 51.66 85.33 89.21 93.82 112.32
(b) α = 512
Fig. 7: Evaluation on the EDB size and search time
t=50 t=100 t=150 t=200 t=250 t=300
time (s)
200k
400k
600k
800k
1000k
1200k
1400k
1600k
1800k
2000k
2200k
2400k
ED
B 
siz
e
40k
50k
60k
70k
80k
90k
100k
110k
120k
130k
Ca
ch
e 
siz
e
EDB size
Cache size
Fig. 8: Flushing operation
window, 20 seconds, to trigger flushing. If these clusters do
not exceed up to 75% of their original capacities, then the
flushing operation is invoked.
Figure 8 reports EDB size and cache size over the time
with a scanning window of 20 seconds. The operation occurs
at t = 73, 45, 80, 121, 144, 189, 222, 272, and 331 seconds.
We observe that the cache size drops significantly at these
timestamps since Cache Controller flushes the cached pairs to
Padding Controller. Note that the EDB and cache sizes are flat
while Padding Controller performs padding and encryption.
Re-encryption: To investigate the performance of re-
encryption, we experiment ShieldDB after 175 seconds op-
erated with NH at α = 256. We select the keyword clus-
ter that has the most entries stored in EDB for the re-
encryption. This keyword set is also re-used as the query
set to benchmark the query performance before, during, and
after re-encryption. There are 180,677 real entries associating
with 256 keywords of this cluster. Table 4 demonstrates
the performance of the re-encryption. This operation takes
131.3 seconds for fetching process, and 103.11 seconds for
padding and re-insertion. During the operation, the average
query time per keyword is the smallest due to the deletion
of all entries in the selected cluster. Note that this query
time takes into account the search over local cache clusters
if the keyword is not available in EDB. After re-encryption,
the number of bogus entries used for the cluster is nearly
TABLE 4: Re-encryption on the largest cluster
Before During After
Bogus entries used 643,131 230,715 230,715
Search time (ms) 379.37 0.03 210.18
TABLE 5: Query reconstruction time (s)
Setting α = 256 α = 512
t = 75 t = 175 t = 75 t = 175
NH 9,729.2 94,499.1 7,909.8 138,303.1
PH 1,004.2 24,408 13,858.3 177,852.6
reduced by 64.1%, making the average search time shorter.
Security evaluation. We further investigate the attack efforts
in two attack models. Both adversaries launch the gener-
alised count attacks separately at t = 75 and t = 150. Unlike
the count attack, the generalised one enables the attack to
run against padding countermeasures. It does not require an
exact unique result length to infer query keywords. Instead,
it initialises a guess mapping for each query to a group
of possible candidate keywords that have the result length
within a window as large as the maximum number of false
co-occurrence counts. Then, for each candidate keyword,
co-occurrence matrix will be constructed to infer the query
keyword for the rest query tokens. If an inconsistency is
found during that inference, a next candidate keyword
will be examined. The reason for launching that keyword
mapping is because the adversary may know that padding
can cause additional ”false co-occurrence counts” in the
result length of query keywords. In our experiment, the
maximum number of ”false co-occurrence counts” is found
by the keyword that has the greatest number of bogus
documents when the attack is launched. Table 5 reports the
query reconstruction times of these attacks in second unit.
We observe that the reconstruction time is proportional with
the EDB size and the result length of query keywords.
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TABLE 6: Overall performance of ShieldDB throughout a 175-second streaming period
Setting Adversary Target Throughput per second Avg. cache load Padding overhead
α = 256 α = 512 α = 256 α = 512 α = 256 α = 512
NH Non-persistent 2,634.27 1,459.62 99,347.8 82,267.8 3.8∼4.12 5.6∼5.8
NL Non-persistent 2,779.77 1,515.74 168,681.4 164,960 0.07∼0.13 0.06∼0.16
PH Persistent 2,702.05 1,289.64 97,351.6 97,557.6 4.8∼6.3 6.4∼8.9
PL Persistent 2,833.46 1,590.46 195,702.2 196,413.6 0.08∼0.14 0.08∼0.23
Also, a larger α makes the attacks harder when inferring
the query keywords of query tokens due to the greater num-
ber of keyword candidates for each query tokens. Clearly,
we cannot rely completely on the computational demand
to mitigate the attacks. Hence, a practical solution should
be the use of re-encryption, as presented in Table 4. Re-
encryption helps to refresh the leakage of query keywords.
In addition, the co-occurrence matrix will also be changed
due to the use of different bogus documents.
Overall system performance: Table 6 summarises the per-
formance of Padding Service regarding three critical mea-
surements of throughput per second, average cache size at
every second, and the overall padding overhead. As seen,
there are no perfect padding strategies that can achieve
a great balance on system throughput, local cache load,
and padding overhead. Low padding mode makes a higher
throughput value and lightens padding overhead, but it
incurs a significant cache load. In contrast, high padding
mode makes the cache load lightweight, but it introduces
a higher padding overhead.
Note that the padding strategies against the persistent
adversary are also applicable to the non-persistent adver-
sary. The first batch condition can theoretically make some
clusters might be not achieved in a long time if some
keywords never appear. However, this is not the case in our
current experiments. Therefore, the throughput for PH and
NH, and PL and NL is close, respectively.
The value α relates to the security matter. A higher
value indicates that more keywords are co-located in the
same cluster. Hence, there are more keywords have the
same result length over search operations. From the results,
ShieldDB shows the tradeoff when selecting a higher value
of α. That is, the throughput is declined nearly double while
padding overhead increases almost twice.
8.3 Discussion
In the evaluation, we selected the top 5,000 most frequent
keywords extracted from the original (Enron email dataset)
as a training data set. Cache Controller allocated those key-
words into clusters based on their frequencies. Also, the
cache capacity of each cluster was initialised proportionally
to the total frequencies of keywords in the same cluster. With
subject to the security paramater α, the number of keywords
co-located in the same cluster must be equal or greater
than that α. During streaming execution, the real documents
of the keyword set extracted from Enron email dataset
were used for streaming experiment. This experimental
setup makes the current results of ShieldDB limited due
to the similar frequency distribution of keywords during
both setup and streaming. This will facilitate our cache
management and padding strategies to effectively control
the padding overhead.
However, the keyword distribution may not be similar
between setup and streaming phases in real-world scenar-
ios. For instance, low frequency keywords during streaming
may cause a long tail effect. As a result, cache load and
padding overhead will grow exponentially. For instance, if
a keyword only occurs in the first batch of that keyword’s
cluster and disappears for all subsequent batches, Padding
Controller still pads that keyword during the subsequent
batches when performing the padding strategies NH and
NP. Hence, the number of bogus pairs needed to pad that
keyword is large to achieve the same length with other
high frequency keywords in the same cluster. In another
example regarding the padding strategies of PH and PL,
Cache Controller still has to cache and wait for all the low
frequency keywords to meet the first batch condition before
they can be padded. As a result, cache load becomes heavier.
Current operations that ShieldDB offers to overcome the
above issues are only flushing and re-encryption operations.
In essence, flushing can quickly reduce the cache load while
re-encryption can reduce the amount of bogus pairs used
by re-padding all keywords in the same cluster. Hence, we
raise an open question for future works: how to reduce
padding overhead regarding the highly varied frequency of
streaming keywords.
9 RELATED WORKS
Searchable symmetric encryption: ShieldDB employs
Searchable Symmetric encryption (SSE) invented by Song et
al. [9] as an underlying building block to enable search over
encrypted document data without decryption. Curtmola et
al. [25] and Kamara et al. [20] formalise the security defini-
tions of SSE for static and dynamic databases respectively,
and devise concrete constructions with sublinear search
time. A line of schemes [17], [22], [26]–[28] (just to list a few)
are proposed to improve performance and expressiveness
of SSE. Driven by recent leakage-abuse attacks [12], [13],
new schemes [18], [29]–[31] with less leakage in search and
update are proposed. In [29], a boolean query SSE scheme
is proposed via a symmetric hidden vector encryption to
achieve less leakage in search operations. On the other hand,
studies [18], [30], [31] on forward and backward security
of SSE draw much attention; leakage introduced in data
addition and deletion operations is reduced.
Apart from the above new schemes, engineered ap-
proaches are also utilised to improve the security of SSE.
In [32], [33], re-encryption is adopted to reset the leakage
functions of search and update operations. In the mean-
while, padding countermeasures [11], [12], [15] are also
considered as an effective approach to obfuscate the leakage
during search operations. In particular, Islam et al. [11] pro-
pose the first padding countermeasure for SSE; keywords
are grouped into different clusters, where each keyword in a
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cluster matches a set of identical document ids. This requires
another data structure to help the client to differentiate
real and bogus document ids after search, since all bogus
ids are selected from the real ones. After that, Cash et
al. [12] propose another approach; the number of ids in
each keyword matching list is padded up to the nearest
multiple of an integer, aka padding factor. To guarantee
effectiveness, this factor needs to be increased until no
unique result size exists. However, this padding factor is
a system-wide parameter, and incrementing it introduces
redundant padding for all other padded matching lists. To
reduce padding overhead, Bost and Fouque [15] propose
to pad the keyword matching lists based on clusters of
keywords with similar frequency. Their proposed cluster-
ing algorithm achieves minimised padding overhead while
thwarting the count attack in the static setting. Very recently,
Xu et al. [34] investigate the formal method to quantify
the padding security strength, and propose a padding gen-
eration algorithm which makes the bogus and documents
similar. Again, all the above padding countermeasures focus
on the static setting, where the dataset remains unchanged
after the setup. We note that the assumption in this setting
is not always true in practice, and ShieldDB is designed
to embed padding countermeasures in the dynamic setting,
where the keyword existence is a matter in online streaming.
Encrypted database systems: ShieldDB can also be fit into
a line of research on designing encrypted database sys-
tems. Most of existing encrypted databases [1], [4]–[7] focus
on supporting rich queries over encrypted data in both
SQL and NoSQL databases. They mainly target on query
functionality and normally integrate different primitives
together to achieve the goal. Like the issues in SSE, inference
attacks against encrypted databases [8], [35] are designed
to compromise their claimed protection. To address this
issue, one approach is to use advanced cryptographic tools
such as secure multi-party computation [4], [6]. Note that
padding can also be adapted to mitigate inference attacks. A
system called Seabed [5] propose a schema for RDBMS that
introduces redundant data values in each attribute of data
records to hide the frequency of the underlying data val-
ues. Compared with the above systems, ShieldDB currently
focus on the document-oriented data model and support
keyword search functionality over encrypted documents.
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose an encrypted document database,
named ShieldDB. It supports keyword search over en-
crypted documents with advanced security features. Our
system employs the SSE framework to implement en-
crypted data structures for efficient queries. To defend
against leakage-abuse attacks against SSE, we include ef-
fective padding countermeasures targeting adversaries in
the dynamic setting. To demonstrate the performance of
our system, we develop a prototype, and perform intensive
evaluations on various metrics. The results demonstrate our
proposed padding strategy is practical and deployable in
real-world streaming systems.
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